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Executive Summary
The world is changing. It is becoming increasingly multipolar with the emer-
gence of China, India, Brazil, and with the resurgence of Russia – forming the
so-called BRIC. The world is also becoming increasingly interdependent, not
only economically as recently illustrated with the US financial crisis turning into
a global economic crisis, but also regarding the threats and challenges our soci-
eties face, such as climate change. This multipolarity in the age of interdepend-
ence, or interpolarity as Giovanni Grevi names it, will most likely shape the 21st
century.
The American unipolar moment has ended. Yet, it seems too early nonetheless
to evoke true multipolarity. Indeed, the US remains the dominant power, or the
“lonely superpower”, and is likely to maintain its status for years and probably
decades to come. America’s decline is not an illusion, but it must be understood
in relative terms. US global influence is fading because it contrasts with the rise
of the ‘rest’, i.e. the empowerment of other actors at the local, regional and
global level.
There is a great uncertainty as regards to who will emerge as a major power and
when the US dominance will become definite history. In fact, it is very likely that
only few a countries will emerge as central hubs of the system in the 21st century,
creating a sort of asymmetrical multipolarity with a distinction between domi-
nant or central powers, major powers, regional powers and local powers.
Based on the analysis of several indicators, this paper refines the “BRIC dream”
into a more realistic BR-I-C scenario in which China appears to be the real story
and the only emerging power that can challenge the US in the coming years.
India will follow the path of China but its emergence will be slower and in all
less impressive. Brazil and Russia are probably the least emergent among the
emerging powers, but this is not to say that they are not emerging.
What place will be left for the EU in this coming interpolar order? According to
most indicators, Europe has the appearance of a global power. However, there
is a natural reluctance to join the words ‘Europe’ and ‘global power’ together.
Indeed, the EU is not a power in the classical sense of the term for the very good
reason that it is not a state in the classical sense of the term either. But if global
power is defined as the capacity to have an influence at the global level, then the
EU has certainly some global power, for it is a leading voice in many important
affairs, such as the fight against climate change. To become a true global power
or even a great power, i.e. a major pole in the coming order, the EU will need a
more coherent approach and a more integrated strategy.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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This will require EU member states to increasingly speak with one voice in for-
eign policy. On a global scale, all European countries are now small states. They
are less and less capable of defending their vital interests on their own against
rising powers and are even less capable of achieving major ambitions. Neverthe-
less, when the capabilities of the 27 member states are joined together, the EU
becomes a significant power. There is a strong case for the EU to act together in
foreign policy: Divided we fail, united we prevail.
The EU will also need to develop its relations with the emerging poles of the
coming order through the use of strategic partnerships. A truly strategic use of
the strategic partnerships, i.e. in function of EU foreign policy, must start from
a thorough assessment of EU interests in the various regions of the globe and a
clearer definition of its objectives towards them. In practice, two types of part-
ners may eventually emerge: those with which the EU establishes cooperation in
a comprehensive range of areas – probably at least Russia, China and India, if
they would be inclined to such cooperation that is, and of course the US; and
those with whom cooperation focuses on a more limited range of issues or
regions. In order to promote European unity, strategic partnerships should
establish the EU as the unique interlocutor on a series of key issues, hence lim-
iting the margin of manoeuvre of individual Member States.
For the EU to remain relevant in the 21st century, it will need to promote effec-
tive multilateralism at the global and EU levels, to seal real strategic partner-
ships, and to develop its leadership capacity in order a) to influence the global
agenda, and b) to take the lead in issues of particular importance to the EU.
Leadership and effective multilateralism are complementary and mutually rein-
forcing. They are Europe’s best option to enter interpolarity as a global power.
The EU will not rule the 21st century, but it can still become a major pole, and
it must certainly avoid to be ruled out.5
Preface
This Egmont Paper is the first product of a new research project about the EU
and the BRIC countries, launched by the Institute in February 2009, to look at
how the EU positions itself in an increasingly multipolar world. A vast topic,
this paper is intended as a scene-setter, analyzing just what the geopolitical
changes are and offering some initial recommendations. Forthcoming publica-
tions will focus on the EU instrument of “strategic partnership”, assessing how
the effectiveness of this tool can be improved, and on the reform of the multilat-
eral architecture, offering suggestions for reform that would enhance both the
EU’s presence and the overall strength of “effective multilateralism”.
The EU-BRIC project fits in Egmont’s well established research agenda about
the EU as a global actor and is tightly linked to other ongoing projects about
European strategy. Indeed, it is not just about “a secure Europe in a better
world”, the subtitle of the European Security Strategy: we are also facing the
challenge of maintaining a secure Europe in a changing world.
Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP
Director
Security & Global Governance Programme7
Introduction
“The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be”.
Paul Valery
On 16 June 2009, the heads of state of the four BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia,
India and China) held their first official summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, at the
end of which they claimed “a more democratic and just multipolar world
order”. Eight years earlier, when the acronym BRIC was coined for the first
time, nobody ever imagined that the acronym could turn into a real political
forum one day. Eight years earlier, the world still revolved around the US. Times
are changing.
Today, the world is increasingly multipolar with the emergence of new actors on
the global stage, including the BRIC, the European Union (EU), and various
non-state actors, although it is not yet truly multipolar as the US remains the
unique global superpower. This rising multipolarity will likely define the 21st
century, despite many persisting uncertainties about the coming order, especially
regarding its shape – true multipolarity or asymmetrical multipolarity – and its
rules – competitive or cooperative multipolarity.
A new world order is emerging from where the sun rises, but this might not yet
be the Asian century. Indeed, the US will not abandon its superpower status so
easily. For Europe, the challenge will be very different as its own relevance on
the global stage is at stake. The choice for the EU is simple: ruling or being ruled
out of the 21st century. Either the EU participates in the shaping of the coming
order and becomes one of its major poles, or it will be relegated to the position
of a mere spectator of global affairs.
This paper offers a broad analysis of the very important changes affecting our
world. It attempts to offer a perspective on the coming order without succumb-
ing to the temptation of difficult and dangerous predictions. It focuses on the
emergence of new powers and the advent of a new international structure. More
specifically, this paper places the EU at the centre of its argumentation and asks
the fundamental questions of what this upcoming multipolarity means for
Europe and where the EU fits among the emerging powers.
The first section proposes a brief historical perspective on the current trends
shaping the global system. The second section describes these current trends in
more detail, focusing on three main aspects: multipolarity, interdependence and
multilateralism. The third section identifies the major poles of the coming order,A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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based on a selective set of indicators. The fourth section analyzes the EU as a
potential emerging power while underscoring various important distinctions
with the other (emerging) global powers. Finally, the fifth section details the
EU’s strategy to deal with the current trends and proposes some recommenda-
tions for improving it.
Thomas RENARD1
1. Thomas Renard is a Research Fellow in the Security and Global Governance Programme at Egmont –
Royal Institute for International Relations. The author warmly thanks Sven Biscop for his kind encour-
agement and useful suggestions, as well as Rik Coolsaet, Tanguy Struye de Swielande, James Rogers and
Alexander Mattelaer for their constructive comments on early drafts of this paper. Finally, the author is
grateful to Ludovic Bol for his help.9
An Image of the Future in the Mirror of the Past
It is always hard to predict what History will recall and what it will forget.
Many journalists and experts are prompt to celebrate dramatic events that will
allegedly mark the advent of a new world. In fact, what seems so important
today might be futile to history, and the new world coming might just look like
the old one. As once said by British historian Philip Guedalla: “History repeats
itself; historians repeat each other”.
To our Western eyes, the economic booming of China and India is unprece-
dented, but seen from Asia this is a mere return to normality. A glance at the
share of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Europe and Asia during the
last 2000 years shows that Asia largely dominated the world economy until the
Western industrial revolution completely reshuffled the deck (see chart 1). In the
words of a prominent Indian scholar: “The past two centuries of Western dom-
ination of world history are the exception, not the rule, during two thousand
years of global history”2. If this was not compelling enough, just think about the
following: Between 1405 and 1433, the fleet of Chinese Admiral Zheng He was
so impressive with its several hundred 120 meters-long boats adventuring to
Eastern Africa transporting goods – including giraffes – that it could have “dis-
covered” Portugal long before Henry the Navigator started exploring beyond
the shores of North Africa.3
One should admit that historically the rise of emerging powers and the upcom-
ing multipolar order are maybe not so revolutionary. Indeed, other nations have
emerged before to shape a new world; different forms of multipolarity have
existed throughout History; and globalisation and interdependence today are in
many aspects less impressive than at the dawn of World War I.
Keeping this in mind, one should not entirely dismiss the idea that the world is
shifting and that there might be something new in the changes happening today.4
To begin with, the pace of certain changes is quite stunning. For instance, while
the costs of transportation fell regularly over decades, the costs of communica-
tion have plunged so dramatically (from a $250 three-minute transatlantic
phone call in 1930 to a few cents today) that it fundamentally altered the nature
of international trade. This has facilitated the emergence of new actors (states,
2. Kishore Mahbubani, The new Asian hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the East. New
York: PublicAffairs, 2008, p.49.
3. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987, p.42.
4. See Richard E. Baldwin, Philippe Martin, “Two Waves of Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Funda-
mental Differences”, NBER Working Paper 6904, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research,
January 1999.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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such as India whose economy relies heavily on communication services; and
non-state actors, such as multinationals or even terrorist groups which increas-
ingly depend on communication technology). Internet and the global media
have also developed our awareness of the emergence of these new actors, hence
reinforcing this emergence.
The lightening-fast rise of these new powers is yet another remarkable contem-
porary feature. Compared to the industrial era, emerging powers seem to catch
up much more rapidly with developed countries. The double-digit growth rates
observed annually in many emerging countries largely outpace the 2-3% growth
observed in Europe during the industrial revolution. And emerging countries are
not only catching up economically but also in other spheres of power, including
in the military realm.
Finally, two other major differences are worth being underlined. First, public
opinion is arguably a factor much more important today than it was before in
international politics, forcing most governments to take it into account – at least
partially – while implementing their global strategies. Second, the international
structure is different today, with the existence of institutionalized global mech-
anisms and forums which regulate the international system with more or less
success.
Chart 1: Share of Global GDP (1-2001 AD)A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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It is not the aim of this essay to analyze similarities and dissimilarities between
current and past developments in global politics. However, it is important to put
this research in a historical perspective as an introduction because there is some-
thing misleading in our belief that “everything is new”, just as it is equally mis-
leading to think that “everything remains the same”.13
The Game Board: Shape and Rules of the New 
World Order
The world is changing. This is an undeniable fact despite all caveats recalled in
the previous section. The world is becoming increasingly multipolar with the
emergence of China, India, Brazil, and with the resurgence of Russia. The world
is also becoming increasingly interdependent, as recently illustrated with the US
financial crisis turning into a global economic crisis. The third characteristic of
the coming order is the development of a new structure of multilateralism.
2001: A BRIC Odyssey
Looking back to the recent past, the year 2001 symbolizes particularly well the
definite end of the American “unipolar moment”5 and the rise of a multipolar
order. To begin with, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 profoundly shocked a nation
that saw itself as untouchable and revealed to the world its vulnerability. Sec-
ond, China acceded to the WTO in November 2001 celebrating the entry of the
biggest Asian economy in the global economic system and initiating the dis-
placement of the economic pivot towards the East, although it is still deeply
rooted in the Atlantic basin.6 Third, 2001 was the first year of the 21st century
(and the third millennium) which some already dare to call the “Asian cen-
tury”7. Fourth, the BRIC concept was coined that same year by Goldman Sachs
analyst James O’Neill in order to encourage investment in emerging economies,
without any idea that his concept would turn into a real diplomatic forum
almost eight years later.8
Of course, the choice of the year 2001 is only symbolic, a date that historians
might one day consider to be a turning point or not. In reality, most changes that
are shaping today’s world are long-term trends. On the one hand, comprehen-
sive interdependence has been under way essentially since the end of World War
II – after an inter-war period of deglobalization – and today’s level of economic
interdependence is no more impressive than on the eve of World War I.9 On the
5. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70:1 (1990), pp. 23-33.
6. When China entered the WTO, it was the 9th largest global exporter and the 10th largest global
importer. Since then, it rose to being the 3rd largest trading nation overall.
7. See for instance Kishore Mahbubani, op. cit.
8. Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”, Global Economics Paper 66, New York:
Goldman Sachs, 30 November 2001.
9. Richard E. Baldwin, Philippe Martin, op. cit.; Jeffrey Frankel, “Globalization of the Economy”, in
Joseph Nye and John Donahue (ed.), Governance in a Globalizing World. Washington: Brookings Institu-
tion Press, 2000.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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other hand, the Asian continent did not rise overnight but its entrance into the
modern world was by any standard astonishingly fast. In China, for instance,
the number of mobile phone subscribers rose from less than 5 million in 1995
to approximately 100 million in 2000, to reach well over 500 million today,
with about 200,000 new subscribers each day.10
However, modernity is a very relative concept and it can be misleading to assess
Asia’s modernisation based on an indicator such as the number of mobile phone
users. Kishore Mahbubani offers another vision of India’s rapid entry into
modernity:
“‘Modernity’ is a strange notion. In the West the more basic aspects of
modernity – of modern living – are taken for granted. (...) To understand
the destination of ‘modernity’ that [billions] aim for, it is important to
understand the ‘premodern’ world that they hope to leave behind, a
world I know well because I grew up in it. (...) We had no refrigerator, no
telephone, no television. But the real inconvenience we suffered was that
we had no flush toilet. (...)
Each morning, a group of men would come to take away the metal bin in our
toilet and replace it with a fresh one. There it would stay for twenty-four hours,
filling up over the course of the day. (...) If I were asked to name the date when
my life entered the modern world, I would date it to the arrival of the flush
toilet.”11
From Economic to Comprehensive Interdependence
Saying that the world is increasingly interdependent does not equal saying that
economic interdependence is a new phenomenon. A few statistics illustrate this
quite convincingly:12
• In 1910 the ratio of total trade to GDP of the UK was of 44%; ninety years
later it was just 10% higher, while the US hardly reached a ratio of 25%;
• Capital flows calculated in percentage of GDP are smaller than at the end of
the 19th century for all major countries;
• The direction of trade has remained remarkably stable, with intra-European
trade going from over 60% in 1860 to over 70% in 1996.
10. Michael Kanellos, “How many new cell phone accounts are opened in China a day?”, CNET.com, 31
May 2007.
11. Kishore Mahbubani, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
12. Richard E. Baldwin, Philippe Martin, op. cit.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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But today’s interdependence is not only economic; it is also functional and sys-
temic.13 Interdependence is functional in the sense that the fates of most actors
are intertwined in global institutions with proper competences and enforcing
capacities. These include the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and many more. Func-
tional interdependence is more of a contemporary phenomenon given that the
Concert of Nations and the likes did not have a comparable level of institution-
alization and legal power.
Systemic interdependence means that the fate of all actors depends in the end
upon one single and common system: our planet earth. This is to say that we all
share a limited amount of systemic resources (especially non-renewable
resources), which are necessary for the good functioning of our societies.
Resource-sharing sometimes leads to cooperation, but it can also lead to tension
and conflict. More importantly, and as opposed to the past, the system is funda-
mentally endangered today by at least two major factors threatening dark per-
spectives to all actors equally: climate change and nuclear proliferation.
Together, these three forms of interdependence create a historically unique form
of comprehensive interdependence, which characterizes the second half of the
20th century and will most likely shape the 21st century as well. Comprehensive
interdependence is global, existential and complex. It is global because it con-
nects actors from the entire world; it is existential because the future of the
system and its components is critically threatened (e.g. due to climate change);
and it is complex because different types of interdependence (economic, func-
tional, and systemic) co-exist at different levels between different actors.
In the 19th century, interdependence was already global, and to a certain extent
it was already existential for those countries that relied on their colonies to
ensure their survival against powerful neighbours. However, the system itself
was not threatened as it is today by climate change or nuclear proliferation. In
addition, the three previously identified forms of interdependence never co-
existed as they do today, creating a very complex web of interdependent rela-
tions. For instance, Europe and Russia are extremely interdependent in terms of
energy, while China and America are very interdependent financially with Bei-
jing holding immense reserves of US Treasury bonds; or think about China
entering the WTO when Russia is not a member yet; or think about Beijing,
Moscow, Washington, London and Paris meeting regularly in the Security
Council while other remain excluded. The list could go on indefinitely.
13. The distinction between integrative, functionalist and systemic interdependence was elaborated by
Jaap de Wilde in Saved from oblivion: interdependence theory in the first half of the 20th century. Alder-
shot: Darthmouth Publishing, 1991.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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There is at least one fundamental lesson that we should draw from the previous
era of interdependence: globalization is not irreversible. After WWI, all coun-
tries closed their economies and implemented protectionist measures (such as
the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in the US) which led to a three
decades-long period of deglobalization. With the current economic crisis, many
observers see new signs of deglobalization again.14 The consequences of such
deglobalization are uncertain, but it emphasizes the fact that the level of eco-
nomic interdependence in the coming order cannot be anticipated with cer-
tainty.
The Coming Asymmetrical Multipolarity
Raising the issue of emerging powers and growing interdependence (economic,
functional and systemic) triggers a questioning of the structure of the world
system. To be sure, the structure of the world is extremely complex because all
actors are inextricably intertwined in multiple layers of the system. Despite this
complexity, one can still identify general patterns in the global structure.
To begin with, although some scholars would argue that American hegemony is
built to last, there is a broad consensus about the fact that the American “uni-
polar moment” has come to an end. If one dismisses unipolarity, it seems too
early nonetheless to evoke true multipolarity. Indeed, the US remains the domi-
nant power, or the “lonely superpower”15, and is likely to maintain its status for
years and probably decades to come. The much-debated ‘American decline’ is
nothing absolute: the pre-crisis US economy was still growing fast (and it seems
to be slowly recovering from the crisis, although a relapse is possible); the US
military is more advanced than any potential competitor; and US soft power is
unchallenged even in Asia16.
America’s decline is not an illusion, but it must be understood in relative terms.
US global influence is fading because it contrasts with the rise of the ‘rest’, i.e.
the empowerment of other actors at the local, regional and global level. The
concept of power is relative: the power of one actor is dependent on the power
of other actors. Hence, America is declining not because it is weakening but
because the ‘rest’ is getting stronger.
14. See for instance Joshua Kurlantzick, “The World is Bumpy”, The New Republic, 15 July 2009.
15. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78:2 (1999), pp. 35-49.
16. Christopher B. Whitney, David Shambaugh, “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational
Survey of Public Opinion”, Asia Soft Power Survey 2008, Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global
Affairs, April 2009.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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The expression ‘rise of the rest’ obscures profound differences within the ‘rest’
however. This heterogeneous group is composed of sub-state and non-state
actors (militias, NGOs, multinational corporations, etc.), state actors and
supranational actors (regional organizations). These actors are asymmetrically
endowed and their ambitions vary accordingly. The ‘rest’ is not necessarily
against the West either. Some elements of the ‘rest’ emerge from the West (some
NGOs), others are trying to rise with the West (Brazil, perhaps China), while a
last group is more antagonistic or even against the West (Islamist militias, per-
haps Russia). However, these distinctions are not so clear-cut and lines can be
blurred many times.
Several scholars have been struggling to coin a new term which would encapsu-
late all these changes in the structure of the system. Samuel Huntington
described the world as a uni-multipolar structure with one superpower (Amer-
ica) and several major powers in which “the settlement of key international
issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combina-
tion of other major states”17. The advantage of this term is that it emphasizes
US dominance; the problem is that it fails to take into account two major ele-
ments of our system: non-state actors and interdependence.
More recently, two other scholars have coined new terms describing the world
not as it is, but as it is becoming. The first one is Richard Haass for whom the
main characteristic of the 21st century will be nonpolarity, defined as “a world
dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of
actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power”18. Haass, contrary to
Huntington, puts too much emphasis on non-state actors, arguing that they
enjoy more power than they actually do. Who could seriously believe that a non-
state actor could potentially become a “centre with meaningful power”19, i.e.
with the capacity to significantly affect the system?
For the second scholar, Giovanni Grevi, the world is becoming “interpolar”,
which he defines as “multipolarity in the age of interdependence”20. This con-
cept adequately encapsulates the two major characteristics of the new world
order in the making, and realistically places states at the centre of the system
although insisting that non-state actors can cause critical blows to the system
(think 9/11 or the financial crisis). The main problem is that Grevi does not
explain in what this interpolarity is fundamentally different from 19th century
17. Samuel P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 36.
18. Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance”, Foreign Affairs, vol.
87:3 (2008), p. 44.
19. Richard N. Haass, op. cit., p. 44.
20. Giovanni Grevi, “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario”, Occasional Paper 79, Paris: EU Institute
for Security Studies, June 2009, p. 9.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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interpolarity. He sees three dimensions of interdependence: economy, energy
and environment. However, the two first dimensions were already strongly
developed two centuries ago. And where he sees an “inherent”21 demand for
multilateral cooperation in interpolarity, the pre-WWI order tells us that multi-
lateralism is maybe not so “inherent” or at least that there might be strong
resistance to it.
Instead of trying to coin a new term, this essay considers that “interpolarity”
depicts the coming world order reasonably well, provided we further develop
the concept. As already underscored previously, what really distinguishes
upcoming interpolarity from 19th century interpolarity is systemic and func-
tional interdependence. History should also draw our attention to the fact that
interpolarity is not necessarily a peaceful structure. Another difference with 19th
century interpolarity is the actors: they include empowered non-state actors, and
a sui generis actor (the EU) could even emerge as a major pole of the coming
interpolar structure.
If we are heading towards interpolarity, the current structure is still one of fad-
ing uni-multipolarity in the age of comprehensive interdependence. There is a
great uncertainty with regard to who will emerge as a major power and when
US dominance will become definite history. In fact, it is very likely that only a
few countries will emerge as central hubs of the system in the 21st century, cre-
ating a sort of asymmetrical multipolarity with a distinction between dominant
or central powers, major powers, regional powers and local powers.
Finally, if the world is becoming increasingly multipolar, it will not necessarily
be more multilateral. A multipolar order can either be cooperative, when states
agree to share global power and to resolve global matters together, or competi-
tive, when states struggle for global leadership and are tempted to deal with
some matters unilaterally. Historically, shifts of power have led to both scenar-
ios. It is very likely that at least for some time competitive and cooperative
multipolarity will coexist: America will continue to act unilaterally when it
deems it necessary for as long as it can; and emerging powers will continue to
simultaneously dismiss and resort to multilateral organisations depending on
the context. In the end, one form of multipolarity might come to overshadow
the other. Multilateralism is no destiny, but it surely is a sensible destination.
21. Giovanni Grevi, op. cit., p. 31.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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The Age of Multi-Multilateralism
In the current transition from uni-multipolarity to multipolarity, we observe a
proliferation of different expressions of multilateralism. A fair amount of new
international organizations and political forums have been created in the last
decade, including the most famous Group of 20 (G-20) which was founded in
1999; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which was established in
2001; and the BRIC which held its first summit in June 2009.
There are many more new international organizations, most of which are largely
unknown to a Western audience. For instance, how many people have ever
heard of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-
ARC)? This organization created in 1997 comprises 18 member states and a
secretariat based in Mauritius. Its objective is to promote growth in the Indian
Ocean region. Many probably also ignore the existence of the IBSA Dialogue
Forum (India, Brazil and South Africa), which was formalized in 2003.
Most of these organizations remain little known because they actually do little.
Hence, one could legitimately wonder why they were created in the first place.
The primary reason for this proliferation of formal and informal groups is prob-
ably very mundane: as countries such as China, India or Brazil are emerging
rapidly they are willing to raise their international status by taking the lead in
new “non-Western” international organizations and to gather media attention
through summit diplomacy. In other words, now that they managed their way
to the main stage, they want their share of glitter and spotlight.
In a more pragmatic fashion, emerging powers intend to multiply their eco-
nomic gains through international cooperation, especially in the context of sec-
tor-specific agreements. For instance, the multiplication of meetings between
China and Russia (including within the SCO or BRIC) has facilitated the signing
of major energy deals. Allegedly, China also joined the SCO eyeing the extensive
resources of Central Asia. Sector-specific organizations (such as the G-20 or the
IOR-ARC) are particularly popular among emerging powers because they do
not involve any loss of sovereignty and gently leave aside potentially tricky
issues.
Some emerging powers also see the creation of new multilateral institutions as
an alternative to the existing “Western” organizations, which they regard as
illegitimate. This vision is particularly developed in Russia where the SCO is
seen as a counterweight to NATO (although this vision is not shared by Beijing)
and the BRIC as a forum to undermine American economic dominance (a vision
that Moscow defends more actively and aggressively than the BIC countries,A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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notably arguing for the creation of a new currency to replace the dollar as the
world’s primary reserve currency).
However, emerging powers do not systematically or even preferably sideline
“Western” international organizations. Indeed, they see increased participation
in reformed global institutions as a manner to gain global power. This ambition
appeared clearly during the debate about the reform of the International Finan-
cial Institutions (IFI), and it was emphasized in the first-ever BRIC communiqué
which called for “urgent action” with regard to voice and representation in the
IFIs.22 Demands for a bigger say in global political forums – essentially the UN
Security Council – are also likely to grow with rising multipolarity.
Interpolarity is not inherently multilateral, but the trend seems to be a new form
of variable geometry, in which formal and informal forums coexist and overlap.
The new global order ushers in the age of multi-multilateralism.
Multi-multilateralism is defined by the strengthening of an asymmetrical and
dynamic cooperation process in which (1) countries are becoming members of
a variety of overlapping institutions, creating a new mosaic of multilateral inter-
actions; (2) states meet continuously in multiple forums hence increasing the
density of international relations; (3) formal institutions (e.g. the UN) cohabit
with informal forums (e.g. G-20) in a moving and overlapping configuration.
Emerging countries will attempt to gain a greater say in global institutions but
they will only abide by the rules if they can recognize themselves in these organ-
izations, i.e. if they are no longer perceived as Western tools. In the meantime,
informal multilateralism is likely to become the most convenient way to deal
with new and ongoing crises because they can better adapt to the new world
order and are less constraining for its members. Informal multilateralism is a
good method to integrate rising powers in the “Concert of (great) Nations”
faster than via the classic, more rigid institutions.
22. “BRIC Countries Joint-Communiqué”, Reuters, 14 March 2009.21
The Players: Measuring Power in the New World 
Order
The rise of a multipolar order implies the emergence of new poles. But who are
the real emerging powers? And what is an emerging power anyway? Part of the
answer came from Jim O’Neill, economist at Goldman Sachs, who coined the
now famous BRIC acronym which became tightly associated – not to say syn-
onymous – with emerging countries. Other acronyms followed: BRICS
(BRIC+South Africa); BRICSAM (BRIC+South Africa+ASEAN countries+Mex-
ico); and BIC or RIC (depending on which country is seen as the weakest link in
the BRIC). And yet, these acronyms tell us only part of the story.
The Economics of Power
Goldman Sachs’ predictions are purely economic. Indeed, in economic terms,
the BRICs are rising: in 1995 they cumulated approximately 7% of global GDP;
ten years later their share was just reaching a two-digit number; and in 2009
their share was rising up to 15.5% of global GDP, although they already repre-
sent over 20% of global GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (see charts 2 & 3).
Chart 2: GDP at PPP 1990-2014 (in billion US$)A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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Chart 3: Share of Global GDP at PPP in 2009 (in %)
Next year, China should top Japan and continue to catch up with the US.
According to Jim O’Neill, and with all the caution necessary when handling
predictions, the BRIC economies together will be larger in dollar terms than the
G-7 by 2027 despite – or maybe thanks to – the economic crisis.23 By 2050, the
nominal GDP24 of China could be twice as big as that of America, while India
could rise up to equal levels with the US. In terms of real GDP however, China
will only reach equal levels with the EU by 2040, just behind the US, while other
emerging economies will still lag behind (see chart 4). As for GDP per capita,
expressing the purchasing power of individuals, G-7 members will continue to
dominate the BRIC for many years, essentially because developed economies
will benefit from the opening of new markets.25
Beyond the BRICs, several economies have the potential to emerge in the coming
decades. Based on nominal GDP, Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea in partic-
ular could catch up with most G-7 members by 2050, although only Mexico and
South Korea will be able to rival them in terms of GDP per capita. Nevertheless,
while these countries will catch up with the G-7, BRIC economies will further
deepen the gap with all their followers.
23. Only when using nominal GDP.
24. Nominal GDP is calculated at current exchange rates, which means that numbers are increased by the
level of inflation. Real GDP, on the contrary, is calculated at constant prices.
25. Jim O’Neill, “The New Shopping superpower”, Newsweek, 30 March 2009; Jim O’Neill, “Les BRIC,
Nouvelles Grandes Puissances dans le Futur?”, La Revue Internationale et Stratégique, n°72 (2008/2009),
pp. 231-243; author’s interview with an economist.A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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Chart 4a: Share of Global 2009 Real GDP (in %)
Chart 4b: Share of Global 2040 Real GDP (in %)
Another major difference between the emergence of the BRICs and the rise of
the next economies (Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Vietnam, etc.) is
that the BRICs have had a much greater impact on the global economy. Indeed,
between 2000 and 2007, BRIC members contributed 27% of global growth –
more than the US – essentially thanks to China. In a similar period, South Korea,
Mexico and Indonesia only contributed to 5.5% of global growth and the
impact of their emergence (even including other economies such as Turkey) isA BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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likely to be a smaller story than the emergence of BRICs because they are already
more urbanized and integrated into the world economy.26
Beyond Economics: The Emergence of Power
There is a fundamental distinction between emerging economy and emerging
power, for economy is only one albeit important aspect among other dimensions
of national power. Historically, as brilliantly demonstrated by Paul Kennedy,
economic growth has many times allowed states to increase their global influ-
ence, essentially because they could use their surpluses to build up their military
forces, which in turn allowed them to reinforce and further their global influ-
ence.27 Economic emergence is therefore tightly related to power emergence –
and it can reasonably be seen as a necessary precondition – but it is by no means
a sufficient condition for global power.
As explained in a 2005 RAND paper, “state power can be conceived at three
levels: (1) resources or capabilities, or power-in-being; (2) how that power is
converted through national processes; (3) and power in outcomes, or which
state prevails in particular circumstances”28. The third level is naturally per-
ceived as the most important by policy-makers, but it is also the most elusive.
The second level is also very difficult to measure and to objectify. In the end, the
first level, i.e. the state as a “capability container”, is the most convenient basis
for measuring national power, although indicators remain purely indicative –
not deterministic – and should be seen in light of the two other levels.
Traditionally, when opening the “capability container”, we can identify seven
major dimensions of power, divided between natural determinants (geography,
population and resources) and social determinants (economy, military, diplo-
macy and culture):
1. Geography: What is the size of the territory? How does the geographical
situation influence foreign policy?
2. Population: What is the size of the population? Its structure?
3. Resources: What are the resources of the state? How useful are these
resources?
4. Economy: How developed is the economy? How resilient is it? How inte-
grated is it in the global economy? What is the leverage over other states?
26. Dominic Wilson, Anna Stupnytska, “The N-11: More than an Acronym”, in Jim O’Neill (ed.), BRICs
and Beyond. London: Goldman Sachs, 2007, pp. 129-150.
27. Paul Kennedy, op. cit.
28. Gregory F. Treverton, Seth G. Jones, Measuring National Power. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
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5. Military: How big are the armed forces? How efficient are they relative to
others?
6. Diplomacy: What is the diplomatic position of the state on the international
stage? What is its influence within international forums? As how strong/
weak is it perceived by other countries?
7. Identity: How strong is the sense of national identity? How global is the
culture of the state? What is its general image abroad?
It is not the aim of this essay to analyze thoroughly all these dimensions and
rank the powers – although such an exercise would certainly be very interesting.
The International Futures Model, for instance, developed by Barry Hugues, cal-
culates power as a function of population, GDP, technology, and conventional
and nuclear military expenditure.29 This model allows power comparisons and
is particularly interesting because it is used by the US National Intelligence
Council and therefore shapes to a certain extent the American perception of
power distribution. However, such a mathematical, futuristic model should be
read with extreme caution.
Chart 5: Share of Global Hard Power (in %)
Without going as far as developing a mathematical model, it is important to
underscore that it is a combination of all the seven above-mentioned dimensions
that create global power. It should also be emphasized that power must always
29. Accessible online at: <http://www.ifs.du.edu>A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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be measured in relative terms. Absolute numbers have no meaning if they are
not compared with other actors. In the next few paragraphs, we will just quickly
touch upon some of these dimensions, through some specific indicators.
In terms of geography, a very common indicator used to measure power is the
size of the country. In this regard, the US, the BRIC and the EU all deserve to be
considered as great powers as they rank in the top-10, along with Canada and
Australia. Of course, much more could be said about geography, including the
climate, borders or strategic positioning on the map.
In terms of demographics, China and India clearly dominate the charts with
over one billion inhabitants each. The EU and the US come at third and fourth
place, but their ageing populations will very soon create major challenges that
will require a difficult adaptation. China will also face difficulties in a not so
distant future due to its one-child policy. Russia, for its part, is already experi-
encing a decline in the size of its population, with potentially disastrous conse-
quences.
Military indicators are sometimes regarded as obsolete tools for measuring
power in a world where major wars are deemed to be “improbable”30. This
optimism is not without precedent, and one can easily recall the post-WWI era,
for instance, when people were convinced that they had fought “la der’ des der’”
or “the war to end all wars”. But who can honestly predict war and peace in the
next 20 years? “Strategic surprises” are a constant factor in history.31 Moreover,
tensions are not lacking between emerging powers, e.g. between China and Rus-
sia or between China and India. Hence, military indicators can and should still
be used as a measure of power.
Before reviewing the statistics, we cannot but underscore that the size of the
armed forces is a mere indicator but not a determinant of the strength of a coun-
try. History has seen many armies defeated by smaller forces that had better
commanders, the technological advantage, or better morale. The use of other
indicators, such as the number of warships or submarines, could have perhaps
been more useful but lay beyond the scope of this paper.32
30. See for instance the European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Secu-
rity Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 3.
31. Colin S. Gray, “The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War”, Parameters, vol. 38:4
(2008), pp. 14-26; Corentin Brustlein, “La Surprise Stratégique: De la Notion aux Implications”, Focus
Stratégique 10, Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, October 2008.
32. For a comparison of naval capabilities, see James Rogers, “From Suez to Shanghai: The European
Union and Eurasian Maritime Security”, Occasional Paper 77, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies,
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The US is the world’s largest military spender by far. In 2008, its military
expenditure amounted to approximately US$550 billion, which is almost equal
to the sum of military expenditure by all the other countries taken together. The
EU comes in second position with half the US budget, although these numbers
are misleading for reasons explained in the next chapter. Among the BRIC,
China and Russia clearly lead the game, although Brazil and India have both
doubled their budget since 1990. Australia and particularly Japan are two other
significant military spenders.
China has the largest army with active armed forces of over 2 million. The EU
and the US share the second rank with similar numbers, although as for military
expenditure statistics of the EU are flawed. India comes in fourth position, while
Russia has seen the most spectacular reduction in its armed forces, cutting by
four its effectives between 1990 and 2008. With a fifth of Brazil’s budget, it is
remarkable that Mexico has a comparable army in size.
Table 1: Defence Expenditure (in US$) and Number in Active Armed Forces (1990-2008)
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008  
EU-27 272,224 232,720 236,845 246,214 252,005 Defence expend.
  3,310,850 2,823,250 2,325,689 1,875,711 1,596,275 Number in active armed 
forces
USA 457,641 357,376 342,167 503,353 548,531 Defence expend.
  2,117,900 1,547,300 1,365,800 1,473,960 1,539,587 Number in active armed 
forces
Brazil 8,031 11,720 12,910 13,381 15,477 Defence expend.
  324,200 295,000 287,600 302,909 326,435 Number in active armed 
forces
Russia 171,322 21,680 19,138 28,488 38,238 Defence expend.
  3,988,000 1,520,000 1,004,100 1,037,000 1,027,000 Number in active armed 
forces
India 12,036 12,550 17,697 22,891 24,716 Defence expend.
  1,262,000 1,145,000 1,303,000 1,325,000 1,281,200 Number in active armed 
forces
China 13,147 14,987 23,767 44,911 63,643 Defence expend.
  3,030,000 2,930,000 2,470,000 2,255,000 2,185,000 Number in active armed 
forces
Japan 39,515 42,472 43,803 44,165 42,751 Defence expend.
  249,000 239,500 236,700 239,900 230,300 Number in active armed 
forces
South Korea 12,519 15,477 16,652 20,554 23,773 Defence expend.
  750,000 633,000 683,000 687,700 687,700 Number in active armed 
forces
Australia 9,392 9,994 11,025 13,292 15,321 Defence expend.
  68,100 56,100 50,600 52,872 54,747 Number in active armed 
forcesA BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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Source: IISS Military Balance (1991-2009); SIPRI Yearbook (1991-2009).
“Softer” Indicators
There are still many other indicators that could be used to measure the various
dimensions of power, e.g. quantity of natural resources, level of urbanization or
level of technological advancement. However, we will just quickly mention here
a few non-traditional indicators of power, to begin with soft power, defined as
the “power of attraction”. The US is traditionally described as the master of soft
power, which has taken many forms, from Voice of America to Coca-Cola and
Hollywood. Besides, the US is still dominating this realm of power across the
globe, including in Asia where it largely dominates Chinese and Indian soft
power.33 Europe is also often described as a champion of soft power for its
attractive social model or its developed art scene and cultural industry34. Nev-
ertheless, it is interesting to point out that Asia has deployed many efforts to
develop and promote its soft power in recent years, with relative success. To take
just two examples, Bollywood movies are increasingly popular well beyond
Asia, including in Africa, and made a remarkable breakthrough in the West with
the much acclaimed Slumdog Millionaire; while China, on the other hand, man-
aged to keep several billion people still and breathless during four hours at the
opening ceremony of the Olympic games in the summer of 2008.
Another non-traditional indicator is the perception of power. Indeed, power is
not only about objective indicators, but it is also determined by how actors
perceive themselves and are perceived by others. Not surprisingly, a 2006 world-
wide poll showed that the US was largely seen as the main world power today.35
China came in a good second position, while the EU managed to get a reasona-
ble score essentially thanks to European respondents. Expectations for world
Mexico 2,033 2,807 3,344 3,123 3,938 Defence expend.
  148,500 175,000 192,770 192,770 255,506 Number in active armed 
forces
South-Africa 5,392 3,437 2,884 3,979 3,953 Defence expend.
  77,400 136,900 63,389 55,750 62,082 Number in active armed 
forces
Indonesia 2,135 2,613 2,242 3,571 3,824 Defence expend.
  283,000 274,000 297,000 302,000 302,000 Number in active armed 
forces
33. Christopher B. Whitney, David Shambaugh, op. cit.
34. Although one might prefer to talk about cultural manufactory as opposed to the American industry.
35. “World Powers in the 21st Century”, Berlin: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2 June 2006.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008  A BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
29
powers in 2020 showed that people perceive a strong American decline together
with a rise of China, India and to a lesser extent Brazil, whereas the EU is per-
ceived to be declining by all respondents except Europeans.
Finally, a last indicator is the subjective well-being which consists of people
expressing their life satisfaction. The 2008 Gallup World Survey36 indicates that
people are very happy in the US and Europe, while they are less happy in Brazil
and Russia, and very unhappy in India and China. However, future expectations
show that people expect to be as happy in emerging countries as in developed
countries, indicating strong confidence in their capacity to take advantage of
their country’s emergence.
The True Story: BR-I-C
On the basis of several basic indicators, this section suggests that the acronym
BRIC might hide the bigger story: China. Indeed, the Asian dragon is the only
economy that can really challenge developed countries in the relatively short
term, for it is projected to become as rich as the EU in the next 30 years. The
economic crisis has given Beijing the opportunity to demonstrate its economic
resilience, and the country could still reach its 8% growth target this year
despite the worldwide recession. More than anything else, the crisis has empow-
ered China which is now seen as a key and a mature global economic player
(China is certainly a leader in the making of the G-20 and smartly resisted Rus-
sian invitations to unequivocally abandon the dollar). The crisis also embold-
ened China, whose official rhetoric has become more assertive.37
To support its rising global status, Beijing can rely on impressive military forces
(although more in quantity than in quality) and its real defence budget could be
more than double the official figures, according to US Department of Defence
estimates.38 In short, as indicated by the recent talks about a potential G-2
between Beijing and Washington, China is already perceived as a great power.
Hence, this paper argues that China should be considered as the emerging
power.
Behind the dragon comes the elephant. India is undeniably an emerging econ-
omy, with a forecasted growth rate of more than 6 percent for the next several
36. Gallup World Survey, quoted in OECD Factbook 2009. Paris: OECD, 2009, pp. 254-255.
37. Thomas Renard, “The Coming Order: Strategic and Geopolitical Impacts of the Economic Crisis”,
World Politics Review, vol. 1:3 (2009), pp. 47-50.
38. “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Annual Report to Congress, Washington:
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decades. It is already the second biggest economy within the BRIC at purchasing
power parity, and it could deepen the gap with Brazil and Russia in the years to
come. Moreover, India will not face a demographic challenge any time soon, as
opposed to Russia and – in the longer term – China. As for military power, with
a smaller defence budget, India can still rely on a very large army, although it
requires adaptation to contemporary threats and challenges, and a very power-
ful navy. Thus, India will follow the path of China but its emergence will be
slower and all in all less impressive.
Brazil and Russia are probably the least emergent among the emerging powers,
but this is not to say that they are not emerging. After all, the Russian economy
had an average annual growth of approximately 7 percent since 2000, and it is
likely to maintain a superior growth to any Western country for the next dec-
ades, despite its economic, political and demographic challenges. Moreover,
Moscow can still rely on its regional influence and its diplomatic assertiveness
to maintain great power status. Brasilia, on the other hand, has not yet entered
the small club of great powers, but it is nevertheless emerging economically,
developing as the regional leader in Latin America, and building an interesting
profile as a leader of the developing world – when China is leaning towards the
developed world – and proponent of reformed multilateralism.
Behind the BRIC, several countries could emerge in the long-term. Mainly, the
economies of Mexico and Indonesia should be followed with interest. South
Korea and Japan will remain powerful economies. South Africa is likely to con-
firm its status of economic leader on the African continent. However, none of
these countries can pretend to become a major pole in the coming order during
this first half of the century.
The next section will focus on the EU as a potential emerging power.31
The EU: The Odd Player
The EU can genuinely be qualified as a global actor, given that it has an estab-
lished presence all across the globe. European companies opened branches in
Asia, Africa and South America; the European Commission has a delegation in
130 different countries; European civil and military forces are deployed in mul-
tiple missions on several continents; European literature is translated and read
in many languages; and jerseys of European soccer teams sell like hot cakes
outside Europe. However, there is a difference between being a global actor and
being a global power. The former requires mere global presence; the latter
requires significant global influence. And there is a further distinction between
global power and great power, which is a matter of reach.
According to most indicators used in the previous section (with the notable
exception of power perception), the EU has the appearance of a global power.
The cumulated economies of the 27 member states represent the biggest global
economy and are likely to remain so for at least the next five years, and probably
well beyond. In terms of population, the EU comes first after the giants China
and India; and as for military forces (budget and number of active forces), the
EU stands on the podium.
Of course, there is something misleading in all these statistics. Europe might be
one big common market, but it can certainly not be compared to any other
national economy for many reasons, including the fact that eleven member
states still use their own currencies and that all member states still hold most
economic tools (e.g. taxes, employment) allowing them to steer their national
economies relatively independently from their neighbours. Additionally, when it
comes to bilateral negotiations with third countries, member states often side-
line the EU in order to obtain various benefits, including economic deals. This
is the case with China for instance: when Chinese officials take off from Brus-
sels, it is generally to land in Berlin, Paris or London in order to sign additional
or even conflicting deals. This is the case with Russia as well: Berlin and Rome
have their own policies towards Moscow, often in contradiction with Brussels’
agenda. As a result, despite ranking first in the economic charts, the EU very
often fails to use this incredibly powerful tool to further a common foreign pol-
icy.
The EU can even less be considered an integrated military actor. To begin with,
there is not one army, but 27 armies that occasionally collaborate under the
European flag. And yet, even when they collaborate, EU contingents are much
less flexible than other armies, for instance in terms of deployability: of the EUA BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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1.6 million active men and women in uniform, less than a third are in fact
deployable (below the NATO 40% target).39 Besides, EU military bodies per se
are limited to the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff, while the
EU battlegroups could be described as semi-EU structures (as they are organized
on a rotating non-permanent basis). EU operations are dependent on national
capabilities and goodwill. It is thus not possible to simply compare EU statistics
with other countries.
In the defence industry, European unity seems to be even more distant. The
European Defence Agency (EDA) has for main task to encourage the develop-
ment of a common defence market and the creation of a common defence tech-
nological and industrial base. Indeed, despite several “European” projects such
as the Eurofighter warplane (developed by the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain)
or the NH90 helicopter (developed by Italy, France, Germany and the Nether-
lands), each member state continues to invest separately in Research & Devel-
opment (R&D) and to develop its own armament programmes. To illustrate this
problem, it suffices to say that member states are simultaneously developing 23
armoured vehicles, of which only one is a multinational effort (the BOXER
developed by Germany and the Netherlands).40
Thus, the reluctance to join the words ‘Europe’ and ‘global power’ together is
only natural. Indeed, the EU is not a power in the classical sense of the term for
the very good reason that it is not a state in the classical sense of the term either.
It has been developing many state-like characteristics during the last decades,
and that process is likely to continue, and yet it cannot be considered a super-
state. Nevertheless, if global power is defined as the capacity to have an influ-
ence at the global level, the EU certainly has some global power, for it is a lead-
ing voice in many important affairs, such as the fight against climate change. To
become a true global power or even a great power, i.e. a major pole in the com-
ing order, the EU will need a more coherent approach and a more integrated
strategy.
The EU is a strange animal to be sure, a supranational body filled with 27
national souls. Too often, the EU thinks national and eventually – when needed
– it acts European. The problem is therefore less a matter of capabilities (as
important as they are) than a matter of intentions: “Of the three features that
according to Hyde-Price mark a great power, i.e. the scale of its resources, ‘a
39. Defence Data of EDA Participating Member States in 2007. Brussels: European Defence Agency, 11
December 2008.
40. Axel Fischer, Tuija Nurmi, “European Armoured Vehicles: Current Programmes”, Report submitted
on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document A/2034), Paris: Assembly of the
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sense of responsibility for milieu-shaping, system-management and providing
collective goods’, and the willingness to act, it is the latter which is often missing
in the EU”41. In fact, what the EU lacks to become a great power is a grand
strategy that would determine the long-term overall foreign policy objectives to
be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end.42
In all likelihood, this strange European animal will be animated by national
souls for a very long time. But we can yet implant in it a European brain.
41. Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security in the Twenty-first Century. The Challenge of Multipolarity.
London: Routledge, 2007, quoted in Sven Biscop, “The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition,
Benchmark, Culture”, Egmont Paper 16, Brussels: Egmont Institute, October 2007, p. 25.
42. See Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth and Bastian Giegerich, “Europe: A Time for Strategy”, Egmont
Paper 27, Brussels: Egmont Institute, January 2009.35
The EU in the Age of Interpolarity: In Search of 
a Strategy
At the dawn of an interpolar era, it appears crucial to assess the opportunities
but also the challenges ahead for the EU. Will the coming order be favourable
to the EU or will it seal the end of the “European world”, i.e. a world dominated
and shaped by Western interests and values? What place can or should the EU
claim in an interpolar world? How can the EU still shape the coming order?
In many regards, the power of Europe is fading. Europe has been the central
continent for the last few centuries, controlling the world and its destiny. And
yet, today, Europe has lost its centrality and it seems to be at great pain to defend
its interests, even in its own backyard. This is not to say however that Europe
has no power at all or that it has given up on all of its ambitions. In fact, the EU
might well be seen as an emerging power, although a very singular one.
In short, Europe is not at the centre of the world anymore, but the EU has a
chance yet to emerge as a major pole in the coming order, provided it develops
an adequate strategy. As very nicely put by Chinese scholar Wang Yiwei:
“Europe is a rising power on a declining continent”43.
Effective Multilateralism: Towards a Grand Bargain
On a global scale, all European countries are now small states. European mem-
ber states are less and less capable of defending their vital interests on their own
against rising powers and are even less capable of achieving major ambitions.
Even Europe’s biggest economy has now little leverage over other major coun-
tries. Nevertheless, when the capabilities of the 27 member states are joined
together, the EU becomes a significant power. There is a strong case for the EU
to act together in foreign policy: divided we fail, united we prevail.
And yet, in spite of its significant (potential) power, the EU opted for a non-
conventional approach to international affairs. Indeed, the 2003 European
Security Strategy (ESS) explicitly promotes effective multilateralism as the Euro-
pean approach to interpolarity: “In a world of global threats, global markets
and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effec-
tive multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society,
well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order
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is our objective. (…) We want international organisations, regimes and treaties
to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and
must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.”44
The concept of “effective multilateralism” correctly puts the emphasis on two
desired outcomes of the coming order. First: multilateralism. Despite the devel-
opment of multi-multilateralism, there is no certainty that multilateralism will
prevail in interpolarity, as tensions between great powers could lead either to
confrontational or to peaceful balancing strategies. The rapid rise of new pow-
ers could also destabilize the entire system, as historically illustrated by the rise
of Germany and Japan in the 20th century.
Europe’s preference for multilateralism is based on its own experience of two
destructive world wars followed by a successful pacification and reconstruction
of the continent through multilateralism. In fact, the European project worked
so perfectly that we are now well beyond the initial objectives. Now in its ado-
lescence, the EU must overcome its identity crisis, choose its path and decide
what kind of actor it wishes to become, i.e. to integrate further or not. But
Europe’s preference for multilateralism has also a more pragmatic driver: given
the decline of their global influence, European countries can only hope to
remain relevant thanks to multilateralism, embodied by the EU on the one hand
– in this case integration can be seen as a necessity more than as a choice – and
by other international forums on the other hand.
Looking into the future, member states have strong incentives to remain multi-
lateral. Their irrelevance will only be increasing, and even the power of the EU
as a global actor will be fundamentally challenged by emerging actors. “The EU
would have nothing to gain and everything to lose if it operated in a world
governed by unstable power games in which it was one among various compet-
ing power players. If it is to have its say in world politics today the EU needs to
work within a system governed by rules and norms. The EU needs a world gov-
erned by an encompassing and effective multilateral system if it is to exert its
influence.”45
Second: effectiveness. Criticisms about multilateralism are old and well-known.
In 1923, Ferdinand Tuohy, Paris correspondent of The New York World, wrote
44. A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 9.
45. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, “Multilateralising Multipolarity”, in Giovanni Grevi and Alvaro de Vasconce-
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a little mocking song46 about the League of Nations that still finds an echo
today:
Yes, we’ll have no decisions,
We’ll have no decisions today
Our League of Nations Exists on foundations
Of dodging, debates and delay.
So with Europe dissolving
We sit resolving
That yes, we’ll have no decisions,
We’ll have no decisions today
Multilateralism is often deemed to be slow and ineffective. To be sure, many
criticisms of the problems of multilateral cooperation are sound. But the chal-
lenge of all governments is to make multilateralism work, not to merely dismiss
it. In the age of interpolarity, many issues require a multilateral effort and simply
cannot be solved unilaterally or without coordination, for states have neither the
necessary means nor the power. These challenges directly or indirectly affect all
actors and potentially endanger the system itself. They include – but are not
limited to – climate change, nuclear proliferation, migration, pandemics, eco-
nomic crisis, food crisis, and global poverty. Therefore, ensuring the effective-
ness of multilateralism is not only a European preference. It is a shared necessity.
Europe’s call for effective multilateralism also has something to do with internal
coherence. If the EU does not act on one strategy, does not talk with one voice,
how could it use multilateral forums effectively? EU members have quantita-
tively a lot of weight within international organisations. At the UN, for instance,
Europe holds two permanent seats and one third of all seats in the Security
Council, and it counts one eighth of the seats in the General Assembly. And yet,
despite this large (over-)representation, the EU too often fails to significantly
influence debates, not least due to a lack of coherence between member states.47
If the EU were to act more coherently at the UN and in other multilateral
forums, it would undeniably empower Europe, and it could also make these
international forums more effective and therefore more relevant. In other words,
global effective multilateralism is linked to the internal effectiveness of the EU’s
external representation.
46. This song was a parody of the 1922 major hit novelty song “Yes! We have no bananas”.
47. Richard Gowan, “The European Security Strategy’s Global Objective: Effective Multilateralism”, in
Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (ed.), The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global
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Last but not least, effective multilateralism concerns the reform of the multilat-
eral system. The EU is clearly overrepresented in current international forums,
while emerging powers express growing demands for a greater voice. This inev-
itably creates frictions, but it could also create an avenue for a grand bargain:
More voices for emerging powers in exchange for major advances in relevant
global issues and key bilateral affairs. The EU has no reason to fear such grand
bargain for a) current multilateral forums were created on Western models and
are therefore promoting Western values and b) European member states can
easily compensate their relative (or absolute) loss of influence by pooling their
voices. A grand bargain could strengthen effective multilateralism, consolidate
EU coherence, and bring solutions to several key issues.
But what if effective multilateralism fails? After all, the Copenhagen summit is
likely to deceive European expectations; and European dissensions over Russia
or China are likely to last. So what is Europe’s second-best alternative to effec-
tive multilateralism? When there is a consensus among EU member states (e.g.
climate change), Europe should assert itself as a global leader – when possible –
and show the road to follow. Simultaneously, it should develop a more realistic
approach, using alternatively the stick and the carrot in a more assertive fashion
in order to achieve a desired outcome. In contrast, when there is no consensus
among European countries (e.g. in discussions with China or Russia) they
should at least subscribe to a rule of transparency and automatically inform the
EU, at an early stage, of all important bilateral arrangements with strategic part-
ners, so as to allow for debate in the EU institutions and de-conflicting of poten-
tially competing interests.
Make EU Partnerships Strategic
In order to remain relevant in the 21st century, the EU will need to develop its
relationships with other global powers. Given that the main characteristic of
interpolarity is the near impossibility to act alone in global affairs, the power of
each actor depends on its relations with other global actors, and its capacity to
influence them. In this regard, the future of the EU does not look particularly
bright.
Of course, Europe has excellent relations with the US, but the relationship some-
times looks more asymmetrical than one might hope. With regard to China,
Europe’s approach is divided and lacks a clear strategy, which results in a weak-
ened position vis-à-vis Beijing. The relation with Russia is essentially centred on
energy issues and Europe displays even more fundamental divisions than in the
case of China. As for India, the EU can just not convince New Delhi that it isA BRIC IN THE WORLD: EMERGING POWERS, EUROPE, AND THE COMING ORDER
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more than a mere economic market. The list could go on. In short, Europe’s
relations with other powers have been characterized either by asymmetry, divi-
sion, or near irrelevance.
In order to develop its relations with key actors, the EU has launched a series of
strategic partnerships, although these have largely failed to be seen as anything
close to strategic.48 A first and major problem is the lack of understanding of the
concept itself. It has never been defined and is consequently seen and interpreted
differently by many actors within the EU, without mentioning those outside the
EU. Similarly, the objectives of the strategic partnerships are ill-defined. Apart
from installing various annual meetings and summits, it is not clear what the
creation of a strategic partnership entails: which common objectives and espe-
cially joint actions are to be pursued in which policy areas? Who takes the lead
in these partnerships on the EU side? Often it appears as if the existence of a
partnership is more important than its content and its potential for the EU and
for the bilateral relationship. Of course, strategic partnerships are a well-under-
stood means to insert a new dynamic into a relationship that is deemed to be
important. They also aim at providing a “comprehensive, coherent, and coordi-
nated long-term framework”49 to the relationship. But the role of these partner-
ships in the context of effective multilateralism remains unclear.
Another major problem relates to the countries that qualify for a strategic
partnership. There are few established criteria, except that partnerships can be
signed with “third countries, and international, regional or global organisations
which share the principles [of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dig-
nity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the
United Nations Charter and international law]”50 and that “the strategic part-
ner status is specifically intended to derive from the capacity of a country to
exert a significant influence on global issues”51. At this point, the EU has or is
negotiating nine strategic partnerships with other States (Brazil, Canada, China,
India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and the United States), and two
with international organizations (the African Union and NATO). It seems quite
obvious that not each of these is equally strategic. Most of these countries unde-
niably exercise regional leadership or are a significant player for one specific
global issue. This makes them strategic as regards one region, or one issue. But
is this a sufficient condition to make them a strategic partner? Can Mexico and
48. Sven Biscop and Thomas Renard, “The EU’s Strategic Partnerships with the BRICs: Where is the
Strategy?”, Brussels: Bureau of European Policy Advisers, September 2009.
49. “Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership”, COM(2006) 347, Brussels, 28 June 2006.
50. Lisbon Treaty, Article 22.
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South Africa really be put on an identical level with China, Russia and the
United States?
The danger is to overstretch the concept, on the one hand, leading to an amal-
gam between important relationships and strategic relationships. Such over-
stretch creates confusion within the EU, but also in the eyes of its partners and
in the way they interpret Europe’s ambitions. On the other hand, there is an
equal – and tightly related – risk of diluting the symbolic but also real impor-
tance of the concept with each new partnership. “Strategic partnership” has
become a very fashionable term, emptied of its real substance.
A truly strategic use of the strategic partnerships, i.e. in function of EU foreign
policy, must start from a thorough assessment of EU interests in the various
regions of the globe and a clearer definition of its objectives towards them. In
practice, two types of partners may eventually emerge: those with which the EU
establishes cooperation in a comprehensive range of areas – probably at least
Russia, China and India, if they would be inclined to such cooperation that is,
and of course the US; and those with whom cooperation focuses on a more
limited range of issues or regions. In order to promote European unity, strategic
partnerships should establish the EU as the unique interlocutor on a series of key
issues, hence limiting the margin of manoeuvre of individual Member States.
Without strategy, the strategic partnerships will quickly become irrelevant. With
a strategy, they can potentially become very effective instruments of a united
European foreign policy.41
Conclusion
The rules of the great game for global power are changing. The US cannot play
alone anymore. President Obama has already recognized China as a new major
player, notably when he declared that “the relationship between the United
States and China will shape the 21st century” during a visit to Beijing last July.
In other words, both countries are likely to become the central powers of the
coming order. Russia and Europe are trying to stay in the game, while Brazil and
India are trying to step in. They all have the potential to become major or middle
powers, provided they avoid being “game over”.
More players in the game also means that the way of playing is different. The
attractiveness of unilateralism is declining because ever less issues can be dealt
with unilaterally in the age of interpolarity. More likely, the coming order will
witness a growing share of multilateralism, although under many different
aspects. Today’s multi-multilateralism is characterized by the coexistence of for-
mal and informal; global and regional; general and issue-specific forums. This
complex network of multilateral forums is a natural mirror of the broader
trends affecting the system and its flexibility alone allowed it to integrate emerg-
ing powers in the global system so rapidly. Multi-multilateralism is nonetheless
doomed to be replaced by a reformed global multilateral structure if it is to
satisfy the growing aspirations of the emerging players and to tackle global chal-
lenges effectively. In other words, multi-multilateralism is a transitory phase
towards either reformed multilateralism or the end of multilateralism as we
know it.
Although the EU arguably favours a multilateral approach to international rela-
tions, multilateralism might not always be favourable to the EU. Indeed, the EU
advocates systemic and rule-based multilateralism and might therefore rapidly
find itself in a relatively uncomfortable position in a multi-multilateral order. To
begin with, the failure to negotiate a reform of the global multilateral system
could push the emerging powers away from Western-inspired forums and
encourage them to create alternative institutions. Conversely, organising a grand
bargain with the emerging powers could offer an unprecedented opportunity to
solve major issues. Finally, the formation of bilateral or multilateral alliances
excluding the EU could be potentially damaging; a G-2 between China and
America e.g. would slowly but inevitably make the US lean towards Asia, away
from Europe.
For the EU to remain relevant in the 21st century, it will need to promote effec-
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ships, and to develop its leadership capacity in order a) to influence the global
agenda, and b) to take the lead in issues of particular importance to the EU.
Leadership and effective multilateralism are complementary and mutually rein-
forcing. They are Europe’s best option to enter interpolarity as a global power.
The EU will not rule the 21st century, but it can still become a major pole, and
it must certainly avoid to be ruled out.